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Analysing Perceptions of Sharia Law Students on the Khilafah in Indonesian State Islamic Universities

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This study aims to analyze the perceptions of Sharia students toward the concept of Khilafah at State Islamic Universities in Indonesia. Using a survey method, data were collected through a validated and reliable instrument consisting of 29 questions. A total of 332 respondents from nine institutions participated in this research. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics to evaluate various aspects of Khilafah as proposed by Taqiyuddin an Nabhani. The results indicate that Sharia students generally have a positive perception of the Khilafah concept according to Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, with aspects such as the functions and establishment of the Khilafah receiving high ratings. However, aspects related to the form of the Islamic state and government were rated less favorably. Another finding reveals that Sharia students from outside Java have a better perception compared to students from Java, with the former being more open to accepting the views on Khilafah. This study recommends further research to understand the factors influencing these perceptions and their implications for Sharia education and broader discussions on Islamic governance.

Keywords: Perception; Sharia; Khilafah

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INTRODUCTION

Israel's military aggression against Palestine constitutes a violation of human rights, triggering a significant humanitarian crisis. This crisis is evidenced by numerous deaths, the displacement of refugees, and the decline in the welfare of Gaza's population due to the destruction of homes and loss of jobs (Cahya, 2022). Economically, the Israeli-Hamas conflict has reduced the demand for Israeli products, impacting the share prices of companies supporting Israel. This decline is attributed to widespread boycott movements promoted through mass media (Rahmani, 2023; Septiazi & Yuliana, 2023),

The geopolitical response to this crisis highlights the limitations of international institutions. The UN Security Council has been unable to curb Israeli military aggression against Gaza, mainly due to the United States consistently vetoing resolutions against Israel (Eliandy, Heriadi, & Tumangger, 2023). The International Criminal Court under the 1998 Rome statute has the authority to prosecute Israeli war crimes even if it has not ratified the Rome statute (Damayanti, 2020). But until now the International Court of Justice has not prosecuted the country.

Amid disillusionment with international mechanisms, some voices advocate reviving Islamic governance under the Khilafah system. For instance, Zahida Ar Rasyida in Kalimantan Post (28/12/2023) emphasized, "Boycott is caring, jihad is the solution," while Tintamedia (5/12/2023) suggested that "Jihad and Khilafah" are comprehensive solutions for Palestine. Conversely, articles like those from Sindonews.com (23/12/2023) and Antarakaltim (17/12/2023) warned against Khilafah and jihad propaganda disguised as humanitarian efforts. These divergent narratives underscore the polarizing nature of Khilafah discussions in public discourse.

Academically, the Khilafah remains a topic of significant study. For instance, Zain (2019) examines the theoretical foundations of the Khilafah in Islam, Sahidin (2021) analyzes Al-Mawardi's interpretations about Khilafah, and Jannah (2019) investigates the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924. Survey data from Malaysia indicates that the idea of an Islamic state is broadly rejected, with 66.8% of respondents strongly opposing it (Abdullah, Yaacob, & Fauzee, 2020). In Indonesia, however, views among Islamic mass organization leaders vary and are divided into three groups, namely the first group holds the view that the Khilafah must be fought without changing the face of state identity, the second group views that the Khilafah is essential and its values do not contradict the state that currently exists, and the third group considers that it is a necessity and even an obligation to uphold the Khilafah system (Ibrahim, Wirianto, & Adib, 2022).

Studies also highlight generational differences in perception. Research on 11th-grade high school students in Sidoarjo shows that 57% support the implementation of Islamic law, while 43% oppose it (Tajrin & Romadlon, 2023). Meanwhile Saleh and Arif (2019) reveals acceptance among Pekanbaru residents of Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideas, emphasizing the continuation of Islamic life through Sharia enforcement.

Meanwhile, there are not many surveys about the Khilafah among students, especially Sharia students. While Wibowo and Subando (2023) has measured the perception of Sharia students about the Khilafah but the scope is only religious universities in the Central Java region. There have been no surveys about the Khilafah for Sharia students in Aceh, Padang, Ambon, and Mataram which are areas that once had Islamic rule in the royal era. This research addresses these gaps by focusing on Sharia students as agents of

reform and intellectual leaders in Islamic law, whose perceptions could influence future movements. Understanding their views provides a quantitative complement to existing qualitative studies and contributes to broader discussions on Islamic governance and public opinion.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Fachrurozi (2008) studied Islamic leadership from theological and social aspects, categorizing it into imamate (theological) and emirate (sociological), while Khilafah is more general. Akbar (2017) analyzed the concept and reality of the Khilafah system, finding that neither the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia nor the Islamic Republic of Iran reflects the Khilafah system as it was during the era of the *Khulafaur Rashidin*. Meanwhile, Ahyar (2018) studied the relevance of the Khilafah concept in modern politics. The results showed that Khilafah does not align with modern political systems that divide power into judicial, executive, and legislative branches, quoting Imam Al-Mawardi's view that the Khalifah holds supreme and absolute authority.

A literature review revealed studies on public perceptions of the Khilafah, such as the research by Saleh and Arif (2019) measuring public views on HTI (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia). Their results showed that the people of Pekanbaru accepted HTI's ideas, including the Khilafah concept. However, this contrasts with Suparta (2018) which found that the ulama in Bangka Belitung did not reach a consensus on the Khilafah concept, making its implementation unfeasible. This study was qualitative, with the researcher as the instrument, which could affect the process and conclusions.

Quantitative research on perceptions of the Khilafah includes a study by Chusniyah (2012), who developed an

attitude model towards the establishment of an Islamic state (Khilafah) was conducted. The results showed that the ideology of the state (the teaching for establishing an Islamic government) satisfied the respondents' attitudes. The ideology of the state is perceived to provide certainty in a time of uncertainty and offer protection for respondents against religious threats.

A review of the literature revealed many surveys on the Khilafah. A study at UIN Alauddin Makassar showed that 53.73% of students at the Faculty of Teacher Training and Education (FKIK) supported Indonesia becoming a Khilafah, while 37.31% opposed the idea. This survey reinforced a 2010 report by the Research and Development Agency in Makassar, which stated that 63.5% of students supported the Khilafah, with 17.1% strongly agreeing (Rijal, 2017). A Khilafah survey was also conducted in Jakarta; Fanani (2013) surveyed students in the Jabodetabek area, revealing that 84.8% of private school students supported the enforcement of Islamic Sharia.

The surveys above provide an overview of public perceptions of the Khilafah but do not explain in detail the specific elements of the Khilafah that are accepted or rejected by society. Sheikh Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, as the key thinker behind the Khilafah promoted by HTI, offers a distinctive view on the function of the state, the form of the state, the system of governance, and the constitution for non-Muslims. A review of the literature indicates that there is no survey research specifically measuring public perceptions, especially among Sharia students, regarding the Khilafah system from Sheikh Taqiyuddin's perspective.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Attitude is the acceptance, rejection, or evaluation of a psychological object; in this research, the Khilafah system is the object. Attitudes can influence behavior, such as supporting or advocating for the Khilafah. Based on Taqiyuddin An Nabhani's theory and state studies, the measurement of Khilafah encompasses seven aspects: its essence, function, establishment through a Khalifah, sovereignty, form of state, governance system, and constitution for non-Muslims.

The essence of the state involves a discussion on the definition of a state, aligning with Harahap's (2019) view in his research, "The Influence of Teachers' Ability to Evaluate the Results of Students' Learning in PPKn on the Essential State Concepts in Class X of SMA Negeri 2 Padang Bolak." In his research, HARAHAAP (2019) created an instrument to measure students' perceptions of the essence of the state by presenting various definitions of a state. Scholars such as Kusriyah (2017), Maggalatung and Yunus (2013), Muhtada and Diniyanto (2012), Diniyanto (2012), and Sari (2015) state that the essence of the state concerns defining it. According to Taqiyuddin An Nabhani, the Khilafah state is a global leadership of Muslims for enforcing Islamic law and spreading the message of Islam worldwide (An-Nabhani, 2002; Arifin, 2017).

The state's function in achieving *maqasid al-sharia* is to enforce Islamic law through fair sanctions. According to Al Mawardi, the Khalifah is responsible for upholding religion, ensuring justice, maintaining security, and enforcing *hudud* (Diana, 2017). The Khalifah prohibits alcohol to protect the mind, imposes penalties for apostasy to safeguard religion, punishes criminals to ensure security, and sanctions rebels to maintain the stability of the state.

The Khilafah state is established through public awareness and the legitimacy of a person becoming a Khalifah through the pledge of allegiance (Riadi, 2014). The Khalifah must be Muslim as they will enforce Islamic law, and if they apostasize, their authority is revoked (Supriadi, 2021). An-Nabhani's theory of power and sovereignty states that the Khalifah has the authority to make laws, while citizens have the right to participate in legislation. This concept aligns with Al Maududi's theory of sovereignty, which asserts that human life should be governed by divine law. Al Maududi also states that the head of state must enforce Islamic law, meaning the Khalifah must be Muslim (Anwar, 2002).

Regarding the form of the state, there are various types of states, such as unitary and federal states, as well as different forms of government, like monarchy and democracy. According to An-Nabhani (2007), the Khilafah is not a federal state or a monarchy, but rather a unitary state with a Khilafah system of governance. The Khalifah acts as both the head of state and government, holding the supreme authority over the people, appointing governors, and overseeing executive, judicial, and legislative powers. This aligns with Firdaus's (2019) analysis of the Khalifah's role in "Dustûr al-Islâmy Hizbut Tahrir."

For the constitution for non-Muslims, Islamic law is applied to public matters for non-Muslim citizens, while private matters follow their respective religious laws (Untung & Sutrisno, 2014). An-Nabhani (1997) affirms that non-Muslims generally have the same rights as Muslims, including protection and welfare rights, consistent with Untung's (2014) assertion that "*ahlul dzimmah*" (non-Muslims residing under Islamic law) have equal citizenship rights.

Meanwhile, perceptions of the Khilafah can be measured using non-test instruments such as questionnaires.

According to Subando (2022), the steps in designing a non-test instrument include identifying variables and dimensions, selecting indicators, developing a framework, and formulating items. Guidelines for item formulation include avoiding negative wording, asking about perceptions, and ensuring each item measures a single indicator. A five-point Likert scale is commonly used to measure attitudes (Azwar, 2015; Periantalo, 2015). Most importantly, the instrument must be valid and reliable, with a minimum Cronbach's alpha of 0.60 and composite reliability above 0.7 (Ghozali, 2014).

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses a quantitative approach to obtain a description of Sharia students' perceptions of the Khilafah in Indonesia. The reason is that quantitative research can be used to generalize the population level. This is certainly different from the qualitative approach, which by design is not for generalizing research results more broadly. This research topic discusses the relationship between religion, state, and society. The perception of the community, especially Sharia students, about the Khilafah illustrates how the map of students' perceptions regarding the relationship of their religious beliefs to the state structure.

The population in this study is all Sharia students at State Islamic Universities in Indonesia. The sample is comprised of Sharia students who provide assessments of instruments. The sample in this study is determined using a purposive random sampling technique. Purposive sampling is used to determine the name of the university to be measured, while random sampling is used to determine students who will provide assessment on the instrument.

Purposive sampling is where research subjects are selected because there are

certain considerations under the purpose of the study. The consideration in determining the location of this study is to pay attention to aspects of Islamic political movements in the region and the traces of past Islamic history. Aceh was chosen because it represented an area that implemented Islamic sharia, Padang was chosen because it had a background of fundamental Islamic thought upheaval, Jakarta was chosen because it was close to the center of national politics and became a barometer of national politics, Surakarta was chosen because of its diverse society and many Islamic movements, Surabaya was chosen because it had traces of the spread of Islam in Java, Makassar was chosen because the Muslim region became a barometer of politics Islam in Nusantara, Mataram, and Ambon was chosen as the representative of eastern Indonesian Muslims.

The sample number of 332 students came from the Ar-Raniry State Islamic University of Aceh (3 students), Imam Bonjol State Islamic University of Padang (23 students), Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta (38 students), Raden Mas Said State Islamic University of Surakarta (81 students), Sunan Ampel State Islamic University of Surabaya (18 students), State Islamic University of Mataram (10 students), State Islamic Institut of Ambon (15 students), State Islamic University of Salatiga (110 students) and State Islamic University of Makasar (34 students). The distribution is based on the origin of study programs, comparative madzhab (26 people), falaq (10 people), Islamic family law (96 people), Islamic criminal law (20 people), Sharia economic law (108 people), constitutional law (52 people), legal science (14 people) zakat and waqf management (6 people).

The data collection technique uses a questionnaire/scale measuring the perception of Sharia students about the Khilafah; this scale was adopted from the

results of research by Subando, Kurniawan, and Farkhani (2023). The instrument of measuring the perception of sharia students about the Khilafah has seven constructs (measurement aspects), namely the nature of the Khilafah, the function of the Khilafah, the establishment of the Khilafah, the power and sovereignty of the Khilafah, the form of state and government, the Khilafah government system and the constitution for non-Muslims. The instrument has guaranteed validity because the factor loading values range from 0.4-0.84 (>0.3), and the items are significant with t-values ranging from 5.57-12.39 (>1.96). The instrument also has excellent composite reliability (0.98 >0.7) (Ghozali & Fuad, 2008). Meanwhile, the criteria for assessing the perception of the Khilafah are as follows: average score of 4.01-5.00: Very Good; 3.01-4.00: Good; 2.01-3.00: Less Good; 1.00-2.00: Bad.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Perceptions of Sharia Students Based on Measurement Aspects of the Khilafah

The nature of the Khilafah

The survey results reveal insights into students' perceptions regarding the nature and necessity of the Khilafah. Regarding The Khilafah as a State Upholding Islamic Laws, a significant majority of respondents (83%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") believe that the Khilafah is a state that upholds Islamic laws and promotes the preaching of Islam globally. Only a small percentage (6%, combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") oppose this view, with 11% expressing hesitation. This strong endorsement indicates a widespread belief in the Khilafah's essential role in establishing an Islamic governance system. When asked about the necessity of the Khilafah for the continuation of Islam beyond rituals, responses were more

divided. 42% of respondents (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") agree that without a Khilafah, Islam would merely be reduced to ritual ceremonies and moral teachings. However, a significant portion (39%, combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") disagrees with this view, and 19% remain uncertain. This shows a divergence in opinions on whether the Khilafah is crucial for preserving the essence of Islam in a broader societal context. On whether the Khilafah is an essential system for Muslims, 50% of respondents (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") consider it necessary. However, 21% (combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") reject the idea, and 28% express hesitation, indicating a significant ambivalence towards the practical or obligatory nature of the Khilafah in contemporary Muslim life.

The majority (of students' perceptions regarding the Khilafah system reveal an overall average score of 3.50, categorized as "Good.", see Table 2.) support the Khilafah as an Islamic state system that upholds Islamic laws and promotes Islamic teachings. According to An-Nabhani (1997), the Khilafah is the general leadership of Muslims worldwide to uphold Islamic laws and carry out da'wah to all corners of the world. The general leadership is referred to as leadership in both religious and state affairs. The definition of Khilafah as general leadership is the same as the opinion of Al-Mawardi (2016) that the imamah or khalifah is a substitute for the prophet who is in charge of maintaining religion and public good. The Khilafah is a practical political force for implementing and enforcing Islamic law. The Islamic government is not a political goal but a means (thariqah/method) to apply the Islamic system and law as a whole in people's lives. Montgomery Watt, Arnold Toynbee, and Michael Hart that the Prophet Muhammad is not only a prophet but also a statesman, so the task of the imamah / Khalifah replaces the prophet is not only to

take care of religion but also to regulate people's lives in state life (Adhayanto, 2011).

Nevertheless, because there is a nearly equal percentage between those who agree and those who disagree that, without the Khilafah, Islam would merely be reduced to a series of ritual ceremonies and moral teachings, this indicates a difference of opinion on whether the Khilafah is an absolute necessity for Muslims. The meaning behind this reality reflects the existence of diverse beliefs regarding the relevance and application of the Khilafah in a modern context.

Functions of the Khilafah

The results of this study also reveal students' views regarding the functions of the state that are believed to be carried out by the Khilafah government in various aspects of societal life. Regarding the Prohibition and Punishment for Alcohol, the majority of respondents (82%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") agree that the Khilafah government can impose a ban on the circulation of khamr (alcoholic beverages) and enforce punishments for its consumption. Only a small percentage (6%, combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") oppose this, with 12% expressing hesitation. This shows strong support for the Khilafah's role in protecting societal morality through such policies.

Regarding the Prohibition and Punishment for False Accusations of Adultery Without Valid Evidence, 81% of respondents (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") support the Khilafah government forbidding the accusation of adultery without valid evidence, also involving punishment for those who make baseless accusations. However, 10% remain uncertain, and 8% oppose this view. Support for this measure reflects trust in the Khilafah's policy to protect individual honor and integrity within society.

When asked about the Implementation of Prohibition and Punishment for Apostasy, 58% of respondents (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") support this policy. However, 24% oppose it, and 17% remain uncertain. While the majority agrees on protecting religion, there is significant disagreement regarding the application of punishment for those who leave Islam.

Regarding Maintaining Security with Punishment of Beheadings for Robbers and Disturbers of Public Order, the vast majority of respondents (91%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") support the use of severe punishments, such as beheadings for robbers and individuals who disrupt public order. Only a small portion (3%, combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") opposes this policy, indicating strong support for strict law enforcement under the Khilafah government.

Regarding the Implementation of Morning Punishment for State Dissidents, 81% of respondents (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") support this measure, with only 7% opposing it and 13% expressing hesitation. This indicates that most respondents support decisive action against rebellion to ensure the stability of the state.

Overall, the data shows strong support for the various functions of the Khilafah related to regulating morality, maintaining security, and protecting religion. However, there are some differing opinions, especially regarding the protection of individuals deemed apostates or those accused without valid evidence. Policies of firmness in maintaining security and societal honor receive more support compared to other aspects.

In general, the score for the aspect of the Functions of the Khilafah is 3.94, categorized as "Good," indicating a strong understanding of the Khilafah's role in

preserving morality, ensuring security, and protecting religion (see Table 2). The results showed that respondents agreed with the function of the daulah (in this case, the Islamic government) to keep the mindset, offspring, property, and soul. This is the same as the opinion of Khusnudin (2020), where Islam regulates state life based on Islamic creeds derived from the Quran and Sunnah, while the enforcement of the state in an Islamic perspective is to implement Islamic sharia and the purpose of implementing sharia is to keep the safety of offspring, mindset, property, and soul. Thus, the function of the Daulah Khilafah is to realize the practice of keeping the safety of mindset, offspring, property, and soul (An-Nabhani, 1997).

Establishment of the government and the appointment of the Khalifah

The data reveals insights into students' perceptions regarding the establishment of the government and the appointment of the Khalifah within the context of the Khilafah system. Regarding the Establishment of the Khilafah through Da'wah, a majority of respondents (75%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") believe that the Khilafah government should be established through a da'wah process that awakens the ummah to the enactment of Islamic law. Only a small percentage (9%, combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") oppose this view, while 16% are uncertain. This shows significant support for the idea that the Khilafah must be founded on spreading Islamic teachings and laws within the society.

On the issue of Public Awareness and *Bai'at* for the Appointment of a Khalifah, 63% of respondents (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") believe that the establishment of the Khilafah is the result of public awareness, with the role of the people in appointing someone to implement Islamic law, followed by the *bai'at* process. *Bai'at* is the recognition of the Ummah to

obey and comply with the Khalifah (carried out after the election) by listening to and obeying him, both in pleasant and unpleasant matters, in easy and difficult situations. While 63% support this view, 13% oppose it, and 23% express uncertainty. This indicates a broad consensus on the importance of public involvement in appointing a leader who upholds Islamic law, although some remain unsure.

When asked whether The Power of the Elected Khalifah Is Illegitimate Without *Bai'at*, 62% of respondents (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") agree that the power of the Khalifah is illegitimate without the formal *bai'at*. On the other hand, 10% oppose this notion, and 28% remain uncertain, reflecting a divide in understanding the legitimacy of leadership in the absence of such an appointment.

Lastly, regarding the Dismissal of the Khalifah if He Leaves Islam, a majority of respondents (82%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") support the idea that a Khalifah should be dismissed if he leaves Islam. Only a small percentage (6%, combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") reject this, with 11% expressing hesitation. This reflects strong agreement on the principle that a leader who abandons Islam should no longer hold the position of Khalifah.

The score for the aspect of Establishment of Government and Appointment of the Khalifah is 3.82, categorized as "Good." This reflects a clear recognition of the importance of legitimate methods, such as *bai'at*, in appointing a Khalifah. The majority of respondents support the idea that the Khilafah should be established through a da'wah process and that public awareness and *bai'at* are crucial for the legitimacy of Khalifah's power. There is also broad support for the principle that a leader who abandons Islam should be dismissed.

According to An-Nabhani (2007), the establishment of the Khilafah through the process of raising awareness among the ummah aligns with this view. There are several methods believed by the ummah (followers) to be used for establishing the Khilafah, including democracy, coup d'état, and the method of the Prophet. However, An-Nabhani states that the first two paths (democracy and coup d'état) will not lead society to the establishment of the Khilafah. The legitimate method for establishing the Khilafah is to follow the method of the Prophet, with the stages: 1) Formation and cadre development (*Marhalah Tatsqif wa Takwin*), 2) Interaction and collective effort among the ummah (*Marhalah Tafa'ul ma'a al-Ummah*), 3) Implementation of Islamic law (*Marhalah Tathbiq Ahkamul Islam*). These stages are carried out through a process of raising awareness among the ummah without violence.

Power and sovereignty of the Khilafah

The data provides valuable insights into students' perspectives on the power and sovereignty of the Khilafah, particularly focusing on the authority to make laws, the right to govern, and the legitimacy of the Khalifah.

Regarding the Right to Make Laws, a significant majority of respondents (74%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") believe that the right to make laws ultimately rests with Allah, and Khalifah's role is to implement what Allah has prescribed. Only 9% of respondents (combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") oppose this view, while 17% remain uncertain. This strong consensus indicates a clear understanding that the Khilafah's legislative authority is rooted in divine law, and its role is to enforce Allah's commands rather than create laws independently.

On the matter of the People's Right to Legislate, the responses are more divided.

While 65% of respondents (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") agree that people have the right to legislate laws, 26% (combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") oppose this, and 13% remain uncertain. This suggests a mix of views, with some supporting public involvement in the creation of laws, while others view it as incompatible with the divinely ordained authority of the Khilafah.

Regarding the Right to Be Khalifah, there is a noticeable difference in opinion. A minority (58%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") believes that the right to be Khalifah belongs to male Muslims, while 24% oppose this view and 18% express uncertainty. The data reflects an ongoing debate over gender and leadership in the Khilafah, highlighting a divide in perspectives on whether leadership should be limited to men.

In terms of the Legitimacy of the Khalifah's Power, the majority (69%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") believe that the legitimacy of the Khalifah's power is validated when the people appoint him. Only a small portion (8%, combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") opposes this view, while 23% are unsure. This suggests a strong endorsement of the idea that Khalifah's authority must be endorsed by the community through appointment.

Finally, regarding the Method of Selecting a Khalifah, the data shows that 63% of respondents (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") believe that *Bai'at* is the legitimate method for selecting a Khalifah, not through elections or appointments. On the other hand, 14% oppose this view, and 22% remain uncertain, indicating that while *Bai'at* is seen as the preferred method, there is still some ambiguity or disagreement about this process.

The Power and Sovereignty of the Khalifah scores 3.66, categorizing it as good.

This indicates an appreciation for the balance between the Khalifah's authority and adherence to Islamic law. The data shows that the majority of respondents view the power of the Khilafah as something determined by Allah, with the laws coming from Him, and the role of the Khalifah being to implement these laws. There is strong support for the idea that the legitimacy of the Khalifah comes from the appointment by the people through *Bai'at*, although there are differences of opinion regarding the role of the people in the law-making process and the gender of the Khalifah. This reflects a broader debate regarding the nature of sovereignty and leadership within the Khilafah system.

According to Al-nabhani (2003a), power is in the hands of the ummah, as understood from the provisions of sharia concerning *bai'at*. Under Sharia, a Khalifah can only possess power through *bait*. According to the *nash hadiths* (directions from Prophet Muhammad SAW), *bai'at* is the only method prescribed by sharia for the appointment of the Khalifah.

The *hadiths* about *bai'at* show that *bai'at* is given by the ummah to the Khalifah, not the other way around. Ubadah bin Shamit said: "We pledged allegiance to Prophet Muhammad SAW to listen to and obey his commands, whether in difficult or easy circumstances, whether in situations we like or dislike, and we truly place priority first" (HR Muslim). Similarly, Jarir bin Abdullah RA said: "I pledged allegiance to Prophet Muhammad SAW to establish prayer, pay zakat, and advise all Muslims" (HR al-Bukhari). Based on these *hadiths*, a Khalifah gains power solely from the ummah through *bai'at*. Even Prophet Muhammad SAW, although he was a messenger, still received allegiance from the people, both men and women. Al-khulafâ' al-râsyidûn also followed this practice. They all became Khalifahs after receiving *bai'at* from the ummah.

Islamic form of state and government

The survey data provides insights into students' perceptions of the form of Islamic states and governments, including their structure and leadership, as follows:

Islamic Government as a Monarchy, only a minority (26%, combining "Strongly Agree" and "Agree") believe that an Islamic government should take the form of a monarchy, such as Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the majority (47%, combining "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree") reject this notion, and the remaining 27% are neutral. This indicates that the concept of Islamic governance as a monarchy lacks broad support among respondents, reflecting skepticism about its alignment with Islamic principles or modern governance systems.

The Caliphate as a Federation of States, a majority of respondents (53%, combining "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree") oppose the idea that the Caliphate could take the form of a federation comprising individual states due to the geographic dispersion of Muslims across continents. Only 17% support this view, while 30% remain neutral. This suggests respondents prefer a centralized model of governance over a federal structure.

The responses of the Head of State as God's Representative are divided regarding the statement that the head of state in an Islamic government is a king acting as God's representative on earth. About 38% of respondents (combining "Strongly Agree" and "Agree") support this concept, while a similar percentage (40%, combining "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree") reject it, with 23% remaining neutral. This reflects differing views on the theological and political legitimacy of a king as God's representative in Islamic governance.

These findings highlight the ongoing debate about the most appropriate structure for Islamic governance in modern contexts

and the diverse interpretations of Islamic political principles. In general, respondents gave a low score of 2.77 (categorized as "Less Favorable," see Table 3) regarding the forms of monarchy and federation in Islamic states and governments.

An-Nabhani consistently argued that the form of an Islamic state is unitary. According to Al-nabhani (2003a), the Prophet Muhammad said: "If two Caliphs are appointed, then kill the latter of the two." (HR. Muslim). From this *hadith*, it can be inferred that the Shariah has restricted the form of the Caliphate state. The Shariah mandates a unitary state for the Caliphate, not a federation. The Prophet explicitly forbade the simultaneous existence of two Caliphs, and this prohibition is absolute, without exceptions, regardless of whether the two Caliphs agree or whether they are in one state or different states.

Another *hadith* narrated by Imam Muslim supports this understanding:

"Since ancient times, the Jewish nation was governed by prophets. Whenever one prophet died, he was succeeded by another prophet. But there will be no prophet after me. There will be many Caliphs." The companions asked: "What do you command us to do?" The Prophet replied: "Fulfill allegiance to the first and foremost Caliph, give them their rights, for Allah will hold them accountable for what they govern."

Imam Nawawi, in *Sharh Shahih Muslim*, elaborates that the meaning of this *hadith* is that if allegiance is given to a second Caliph after the first, the allegiance to the first Caliph remains valid and obligatory to obey. Conversely, allegiance to the second Caliph is invalid and sinful to follow, regardless of whether those appointing the second Caliph knew about the first allegiance or not, whether in the same country or different countries. (Al-Minhaj fi Syarh Shahih Muslim, 12/231).

This *hadith* carries a firm directive (*jazm*) as it is accompanied by a strong indicator (*qarinah*), namely the command to kill the second person appointed as Caliph. Killing a Muslim without just cause is prohibited, and thus, it is also prohibited for Muslims to appoint two Caliphs simultaneously.

An-Nabhani uses this *hadith* to emphasize the principle that Islam recognizes only one Caliph at a time and stresses the unity of the Islamic state. He consistently articulates this view in several of his books, including *Nizhamul Hukm fil Islam* (The System of Governance in Islam), *Ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah* (The Islamic State), *Muqaddimah ad-Dustur* (Introduction to the Constitution), *Asy-Syakhshiyah al-Islamiyyah* (The Islamic Personality) Volume II, and *At-Takattul al-Hizbi* (The Structuring of a Political Party).

Although the survey results above show that some respondents disagree with the forms of monarchy and federation, further investigation is needed to determine whether the respondents agree with the unitary state model as advocated by An-Nabhani. This aspect has not been revealed in this study.

Khilafah system of government

This study aims to uncover insights into perceptions of the Khilafah system of government, focusing on its structure, distribution of powers, and judicial hierarchy. When respondents were asked about the Khalifah as both Head of State and Government, a majority (76%, combining "Strongly Agree" and "Agree") agreed that the Khalifah plays a dual role as head of state and government. Only 7% disagreed, while 18% remained neutral. This substantial agreement reflects a clear understanding of the Khalifah's comprehensive leadership responsibilities in Islamic governance.

Meanwhile, regarding the Khalifah's authority, respondents expressed mixed views. A majority (66%, combining "Strongly Agree" and "Agree") believe that the Khalifah holds absolute authority to govern societal affairs based on his opinions and *ijtihad*, provided that such actions do not violate Sharia. However, 22% were neutral, and 13% opposed this statement. This suggests a general agreement that the Khalifah's authority is bound by adherence to Islamic law.

Concerning the appointment of governors and their accountability to the Khalifah, 56% supported this model, 28% were neutral, and 17% opposed it. This indicates some uncertainty or disagreement regarding the centralization of authority under the Khalifah.

Meanwhile, a majority of respondents (65%, combining "Strongly Agree" and "Agree") believe that the Khalifah's powers encompass executive, judicial, and legislative functions. However, 26% were neutral, and 9% opposed this idea. This agreement emphasizes the perception of the Khalifah as an integrated system with broad governance capabilities.

The absence of an appeals mechanism in Islamic courts was a contentious topic. Only 44% (combining "Strongly Agree" and "Agree") supported this idea, while 26% were neutral, and 26% (combining "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree") opposed it. This division reflects varying opinions on the rigidity of the judicial system under the Khalifah, with a significant portion advocating for a system of checks and balances in the judiciary.

The governance system received a score of 3.58 (categorized as good), indicating general support for Khalifah's leadership role and broad governing powers while emphasizing adherence to Sharia. However, significant ambivalence exists regarding the appointment of governors and the absence of an appeals mechanism in

the judicial system. These findings suggest a need for further discussion on the practical implementation and limitations of authority within the Khalifah system.

According to An-Nabhani (1997), in the Islamic system of government, there is no division of powers such as legislative, judicial, and executive. The Khalifah holds absolute authority to manage the affairs of the people based on his opinions and *ijtihad* (the process of establishing Sharia law through rigorous intellectual effort, typically performed by individuals known as *mujtahids*). However, the Khalifah is not allowed to violate Sharia law, even for perceived benefits. Furthermore, the Khalifah is prohibited from forbidding permissible (*mubah*) actions or allowing impermissible (*haram*) ones.

Khilafah Constitution for Non-Muslims and Non-Islamic mass organizations.

This research highlights perceptions of the constitutional role of the Khalifah in regulating the rights and freedoms of non-Muslims and non-Islamic mass organizations within an Islamic state. Respondents' opinions are divided, particularly on whether non-Muslims, as citizens of an Islamic state, should be subject to Islamic law in public spaces. Only 36% (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") support this idea, while 39% (combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") oppose it, and 24% remain neutral. This division reflects diverse views on the extent to which Sharia applies to non-Muslim citizens.

There is greater consensus regarding the regulation of non-Muslims' behavior in public spaces under Islamic law. At the same time, private matters such as food and clothing are left to individual religious beliefs. A majority (57%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") support this approach, with only 19% opposing it and 23% expressing neutrality. This demonstrates a

relatively strong preference for distinguishing between private and public spheres in the application of Islamic law.

Respondents exhibit contrasting views on whether non-Islamic mass organizations and political parties should be allowed to grow within an Islamic state. Only 37% (combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") believe such organizations should be restricted, while 36% (combining "Disagree" and "Totally Disagree") oppose such restrictions, and 28% remain neutral. This narrow margin underscores ambivalence about the role of pluralism in an Islamic state.

Freedom of Thought in an Islamic State: A majority of respondents (54%, combining "Totally Agree" and "Agree") agree that the Islamic State should provide space for freedom of thought, even if such ideas contradict Islamic teachings. Meanwhile, 18% oppose this idea, and 27% remain neutral. This reflects significant openness to intellectual diversity within the framework of the Khilafah.

Respondents rated this aspect with a score of 3.23, indicating positive perceptions of the regulations concerning non-Muslim groups within an Islamic state, albeit with varied opinions, particularly regarding the restrictions on non-Islamic organizations. These findings highlight the complexity of balancing Islamic governance with inclusivity and pluralism.

Al-Nabhani (2003b) proposed a draft constitution for non-Muslims within an Islamic state, as detailed in *Nidhamul Islam*. Chapter 6 of the draft states: "The state does not differentiate between individuals of the populace in terms of law, justice, or in guaranteeing the needs of the people. All individuals are treated equally regardless of race, religion, skin color, or other differences." Chapter 7 of Al-Nabhani's draft for non-Muslims declares: "The state applies Islamic law to all citizens

of the Islamic Khilafah, both Muslims and non-Muslims, in the following ways: "The state applies all Islamic laws to Muslims without exception. Non-Muslims are allowed to adhere to their beliefs and practice their worship."

For non-Muslims, matters related to food, drink, and clothing are addressed according to their religion as long as they comply with Sharia law. Cases of marriage and divorce among non-Muslims are resolved according to their religion, whereas cases involving Muslims and non-Muslims are resolved according to Islamic law. Other Sharia laws, such as *muamalat* (laws governing social interactions), *uqubat* (punishments like flogging for adultery), *bayyinat* (evidence), constitutional, economic, and other laws, are implemented universally for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Chapter 26 of the draft constitution, as outlined in *Nidhamul Islam*, states: "Every Muslim who has reached puberty, is mentally sound, whether male or female, has the right to choose a Khalifah and pledge allegiance. However, non-Muslims are not granted voting rights." Additionally, Article 106 states: "Shura (consultation) is a right exclusive to Muslims, not to non-Muslims. However, the expression of opinions is permitted for all citizens, both Muslims, and non-Muslims" (Al-Nabhani, 2003b). These provisions, according to Al-Nabhani, constitute the framework for regulating the rights of non-Muslims within an Islamic state.

Table 1. Results of measuring Sharia students' perceptions of the Khilafah at State Islamic Universities / Institutes in Indonesia

Aspect	Statement	TA	A	H	D	TD
The nature of the <i>Khilafah</i>	The <i>Khilafah</i> is a state that upholds Islamic laws and carries the preaching of Islam throughout the world.	27%	56%	11%	4%	2%
	Without a <i>Khilafah</i> governing state life, the existence of Islam is merely ritual ceremonies and moral qualities	11%	31%	19%	31%	8%
	The <i>Khilafah</i> is a necessity for Muslims	14%	36%	28%	15%	6%
Functions of the <i>Khilafah</i>	In order to preserve the minds of the people, the Khilafah government can impose a ban on the circulation of <i>khamr</i> (alcoholic drink) and impose punishment for its drinkers	29%	53%	12%	4%	2%
	To preserve honor, the <i>Khalifahate</i> government forbade grants and accused people of committing adultery without valid evidence	31%	50%	9%	8%	2%
	To realize the protection of religion, the Khilafah government implements prohibitions and punishments for apostates	15%	43%	17%	21%	3%
	To maintain security, the <i>khalifate</i> punishes beheadings, robbers, and people who cause disturbance to public order	36%	55%	5%	2%	1%
	To maintain state security, the Khilafah government applies morning punishment to state dissidents	25%	56%	13%	5%	2%

Establishment of the government and the appointment of the <i>Khalifah</i>	The <i>Khilafah</i> government was established with a <i>da'wah</i> process that was able to awaken the <i>ummah</i> to the enactment of Islamic law	23%	52%	16%	7%	2%
	The <i>Khilafah</i> government was established because of the public awareness that <i>bai'at</i> (appoint) someone to carry out Islamic law	16%	47%	23%	10%	3%
	The power of the elected <i>Khalifah</i> was illegitimate without <i>bai'at</i>	14%	48%	28%	8%	2%
	When the <i>Khalifah</i> left Islam, he was dismissed as <i>Khalifah</i>	37%	45%	11%	3%	3%
Power and sovereignty of the <i>Khilafah</i>	The right to make laws is in the hands of Allah; the <i>Khalifah</i> only establishes what Allah prescribes	21%	53%	17%	8%	1%
	People have the right to legislate laws, not make laws	13%	52%	20%	13%	2%
	The right to be <i>Khalifah</i> belongs to the male Muslims	16%	42%	17%	18%	6%
	The legitimacy of the <i>khalifah's</i> power is valid when the people appointed him	17%	52%	23%	6%	2%
	<i>Bai'at</i> is a legitimate method for the selection of a <i>Khalifah</i> , not by election or appointment	15%	48%	22%	11%	3%
Islamic form of state and government	Islamic governments take the form of kingdoms like Saudi Arabia	6%	20%	27%	36%	11%
	Because Muslims were spread across various continents, the <i>Khilafah</i> could take the form of a federation composed of states	5%	12%	30%	43%	10%
	The head of state in an Islamic government is the king, who is God's representative on earth	11%	27%	23%	30%	10%
<i>Khilafah</i> system of government	The <i>khalif</i> performs duties as head of state and head of government	18%	58%	18%	5%	2%
	The power of the <i>Khalifah</i> is absolute, to regulate the affairs of the people in accordance with his opinions and <i>ijtihad</i> , but it is not allowed to violate the laws of <i>sharia</i> , even for benefit.	18%	48%	22%	11%	2%
	The governor was appointed and is responsible for the <i>khalifah</i>	15%	41%	28%	13%	4%
	The powers of the <i>Khilafah</i> included executive, judicial, and legislative	15%	50%	26%	5%	4%
	In the judicial hierarchy, there is no appeal in Islamic courts	9%	35%	30%	21%	5%

Khilafah Constitution for Non-Muslims and Non-Islamic mass organizations	As citizens of the Islamic State, non-Muslims in public settings are affected by Islamic law	8%	28%	24%	30%	9%
	In private settings, food and dress matters are left to each other's religious beliefs, but in public settings, it is regulated by Islamic law	15%	42%	23%	16%	3%
	Non-Islamic mass organizations and political parties are not given room to grow and develop in the Islamic State	10%	27%	28%	26%	10%
	The Islamic State provides space to develop and apply concepts of thinking freely, including those that are contrary to Islam	12%	42%	27%	14%	4%

Description: TA: Totally Agree, A: Agree, H: Hesitate, D: Disagree, TD: Totally Disagree

Overall, the data highlights a solid understanding of various aspects of the Khilafah system, with some areas, particularly the form of an Islamic state, requiring further clarification and

exploration. These findings provide valuable insights into the level of knowledge and perspectives among students regarding Islamic governance, see Table 2:

Table 2. Results of Measuring Perceptions of the Khilafah at State Islamic Universities / Institutes in Indonesia

	University							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
A	3,42	3,21	3,30	3,77	3,75	3,93	3,60	3,30
B	3,93	3,88	3,66	4,12	4,13	4,08	4,14	4,07
C	3,83	3,69	3,72	4,13	3,96	4,15	3,90	3,60
D	3,43	3,55	3,65	3,95	3,89	4,13	3,72	3,38
E	3,02	2,86	2,87	2,43	2,34	2,49	2,63	2,91
F	3,45	3,41	3,64	3,81	3,75	3,99	3,74	3,51
G	3,13	3,15	3,16	3,59	3,46	3,85	3,10	2,93
	3,46	3,39	3,43	3,69	3,61	3,80	3,55	3,39

Description;

A: The nature of the Khilafah; B: functions of the Khilafah; C: Establishment of the government and the appointment of the Khalifah; D: Power and sovereignty of the Khilafah; E: Islamic form of state and government; F: Khilafah system of government; G: Khilafah Constitution for Non-Muslims and Non-Islamic mass organizations.

1: Raden Mas Said State Islamic University of Surakarta; 2: State Islamic University of Salatiga; 3: State Islamic University of Jakarta; 4: Imam Bonjol State Islamic University; 5: State Islamic University of Makassar; 6: State Islamic Institute of Ambon; 7: State Islamic University of Mataram; 8: State Islamic University of Surabaya.

Mapping the Perceptions of Sharia Students on the Khilafah in Indonesian State Universities

The assessment data on the understanding of the concept of Khilafah in eight universities highlights significant differences across various aspects. The highest overall average score was achieved by the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) of Ambon, with a score of 3.80, while the State Islamic University (UIN) of Salatiga had the lowest average score of 3.39, see Table 3.

Universities in Java

UIN Raden Mas Said Surakarta (University 1) achieved an average score of 3.46. The best-performing aspect was the functions of the Khilafah (3.93), while the lowest score was in the Islamic form of state and government (3.02). UIN Salatiga (University 2) recorded an average score of 3.39, the lowest among all universities. Its highest score was in the functions of the Khilafah (3.88), while the Islamic form of state and government was the weakest aspect (2.86). UIN Jakarta (University 3): This university had an average score of 3.43, with the highest score in the Khilafah system of government (3.64) and the lowest in the Islamic form of state and government (2.87). Overall, the university's performance was relatively consistent, though aspects of the Islamic form of state and government require attention. UIN Surabaya (University 4) recorded an average score of 3.39, which is equal to UIN Salatiga. Its highest score was in the functions of the Khilafah (4.07), while its lowest was in the Khilafah Constitution for Non-Muslims and Non-Islamic mass organizations (2.93). The average score across the four universities in Java is approximately 3.42

Universities Outside Java

UIN Imam Bonjol (University 5), with an average score of 3.69, showed strong performance, especially in the establishment of the government and the appointment of the Khalifah (4.13). However, the Islamic form of state and government received the lowest score (2.43), indicating challenges in understanding the structure of the Islamic state. UIN Makassar (University 6) achieved an average score of 3.61, excelling in the functions of the Khilafah (4.13) but scoring lowest in the Islamic form of state and government (2.34), the lowest score for this aspect among all universities. IAIN Ambon (University 7) excelled with the highest overall average score of 3.80. The strongest aspect was the Khilafah system of government (3.99), while the Islamic form of state and government posed the greatest challenge (2.49). Consistent high scores in other aspects reflect a stronger mastery of Khilafah concepts at this institution. UIN Mataram (University 8) achieved an average score of 3.55, with the best performance in the functions of the Khilafah (4.14) and the lowest score in the Islamic form of state and government (2.63). The survey results indicate good performance by the four universities in the aspect of the functions of the Khilafah while consistently showing low scores in the aspect of the Islamic form of state and government. The average score across the four universities outside Java is approximately 3.66

Table 3. The average score of Sharia students' perceptions of the Khilafah is based on universities

Aspect	University							
	Java				Out Java			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
A	3,42	3,21	3,30	3,30	3,77	3,75	3,93	3,60
B	3,93	3,88	3,66	4,07	4,12	4,13	4,08	4,14
C	3,83	3,69	3,72	3,60	4,13	3,96	4,15	3,90
D	3,43	3,55	3,65	3,38	3,95	3,89	4,13	3,72
E	3,02	2,86	2,87	2,91	2,43	2,34	2,49	2,63
F	3,45	3,41	3,64	3,51	3,81	3,75	3,99	3,74
G	3,13	3,15	3,16	2,93	3,59	3,46	3,85	3,10
	3,46	3,39	3,43	3,39	3,69	3,61	3,80	3,55

Description;

A: The nature of the Khilafah; B: functions of the Khilafah; C: Establishment of the government and the appointment of the Khalifah; D: Power and sovereignty of the Khilafah; E: Islamic form of state and government; F: Khilafah system of government; G: Khilafah Constitution for Non-Muslims and Non-Islamic mass organizations.

1: Raden Mas Said State Islamic University of Surakarta; 2: State Islamic University of Salatiga; 3: State Islamic University of Jakarta; 4: State Islamic University of Surabaya; 5: Imam Bonjol State Islamic University; 6: State Islamic University of Makassar; 7: State Islamic Institute of Ambon; State Islamic University of Mataram.

Overall, the aspect of the functions of the Khilafah tends to receive the highest scores across almost all universities. This indicates that students have a good understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the Khilafah. On the other hand, the aspect of the Islamic form of state and government has the lowest average scores across all universities. This

suggests that while students agree on the relevance of the Khilafah state for societal life, they do not necessarily view it as requiring a specific format in the form of an Islamic state and government. Meanwhile, universities outside Java generally have slightly higher average scores than universities in Java, which suggests that students outside Java are more receptive to understanding the concept of Khilafah than students in Java.

The results of this study of Sharia students at State Islamic Universities / Institutes overall give a good perception (average score of 3.50) with the Khilafah perspective of Taqiyuddin An Nabhani.

The results of this study clarify and strengthen previous Sharia surveys. A survey at the Alaudin State Islamic

University of Makassar showed that 39.55% of students of the Faculty of Teacher Training and Education of Alaudin the State Islamic University of Makassar want Indonesia to turn into a Khilafah to realize welfare for the community; there are even 14.18% others strongly agree so that the accumulation of those who agree and have a good perception of the Khilafah system is 53.73%. As for those who disagree, 5.22% and 32.09% others say strongly disagree, so the total who disagree is 37.31% (Ramdhani, Zulfiani, Nurdin, & Muqsith, 2021). The results of this study also corroborate the report of the Makassar Religious Research and Development Agency Team in 2010, which stated that 63.5% of students agreed with the form of the Khilafah state, and even 17.1% said they strongly agreed (Rijal, 2017).

IZZATI (2016) has also researched Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia HTI in Surakarta; the results showed that HTI as an agent for spreading Taqiyuddin An Nabhani's thoughts was quite good and dominated campus da'wah institutions in Surakarta, including Raden Mas Said State Islamic University (which at the time of research was still the status of State Islamic Institute). Meanwhile, the results of Rohman and Kafid's research (2021) stated that new students for the 2017/2018 academic year who agreed with the Islamic Khalifah were 17%. The results of quantitative research at UIN Raden Mas Said are also not much different from surveys of students in Surakarta and its surroundings. A survey conducted by Thoha and Ma'shum (2022) in Kebak Kramat, Karanganyar, showed that 47.9% of Senior High School students agreed that the khalifahate was established in Indonesia, and 52.1% said they disagreed. Noorhayati has also surveyed politicians, showing that the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is a dead price, but campus Da'wah institutions show that they agree

that the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is replaced with a more promising Khilafah system. The view among students is also the same as that of students at State Islamic Senior High School (MAN) 2 of Mataram, who support the Khilafah system (Noorhayati, 2020).

CONCLUSION

The results of the study show that, in conclusion, Sharia students have a good perception and assessment of the Khilafah perspective of Taqiyuddin An Nabhani. Aspects that received good ratings were aspects of nature (3.48), function (3.94), the establishment of the Khilafah and the process of appointing the Khalifah (3.82), power and sovereignty of the Khilafah (3.66), system of government (3.58) and constitution for non-Muslims (3.23), while aspects that received less good ratings were the form of Islamic state and government (2.77). The study indicates that Sharia students generally have a positive perception of Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani's Khilafah perspective, with aspects such as the function and establishment of the Khilafah receiving high ratings. However, areas like the form of the Islamic state and government were less favorably rated. Sharia students from outside Java have a better perception than students from Java. The students outside Java are more open to accepting the views of the Khilafah than students from Java. This research is only limited to Sharia students, so it needs research outside of Sharia students to provide a more general description of perceptions of Khilafah.

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