

THE REINTEGRATION OF FORMER JIHADIST DETAINEES IN SOLO REGION: CHANGING A WAY OF LIFE IN A NEW LIFE

Indah Gitaningrum¹, and Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf²

¹ Center for Religious and Cross-cultural
Studies
Universitas Gadjah Mada
indahgitaningrum@mail.ugm.ac.id

² Center for Religious and Cross-cultural
Studies
Universitas Gadjah Mada
iqbal.ahnaf@ugm.ac.id

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ABSTRACT

In the process of deradicalization, the reintegration of former jihadist detainee places as the most dilemmatic agenda to conduct. It raises a problematic situation between the issue of security and restoring the former jihadist detainees's human rights. But, the struggle in the reintegration process not only occurs to the state and host community but also to the former jihadist detainees itself. This paper focuses on the story of former jihadist detainees in Solo region who have different experiences in their reintegration process and their strategies to encounter the problem as an effort to erase the radical thinking and start a new life. Solo Region was chosen because it receives a 'stigmatization' as a cultivation region for religious radicalism because of its record on radical Muslim's web and figure such as Abubakar Baasyir (the founder of Islamic radical group namely Jemaah Islamiyah). It also becomes a growing place for Islamic radicalism groups such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah Islamiyah which contributed toward Makassar's Cathedral bombing, Bali bombing I and II and Laskar Jihad and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia which tried to enforce Islamic value in Indonesia. The data of this research was gained by conducting an in-depth interview with four former jihadist detainees in Solo region who are willing to be interviewed under the pseudonym. Also, exposure some references as the secondary data. This article found that a sustainable, gradual, and comprehensive reintegration process in social, ideological, political, and economic aspects could support the effort of former jihadist detainees in the Solo region to establish a new life.

Keywords: Reintegration, Former Jihadist Detainees, Solo Region, The Cycle of Radicalism

INTRODUCTION

The reintegration for former jihadist detainees is often challenging to implement because of persistent stigmatization against them. There is a fear among host communities that if they are returned, they will start a new threat to community stability. Society still believes that radical thinking that has been rooted it is impossible to disappear and potentially re-emerge in unpredictable times. This construction usually

implements to the rejection and stigmatization. But, the reintegration itself has been written in Indonesian Law number 5 of 2018 about national counter-terrorism. The law requires reintegration as a part of the deradicalization program that aims to reintegrate radicalized people into society, including family.

Reintegration could not be separated from deradicalization because it is an integral and continuation process from deradicalization. Same

as deradicalization, reintegration emphasizes the process of reintegrating and supporting the former jihadist detainees into current activities in society, not as a program or resocialization. Instead, reintegration also could be understood as *a process in which fighters (1) change their identity from 'combatant' to 'civilian' and (2) alter their behavior by ending the use of violent means and increasing activities that are sanctioned by the mainstream community* (Torjesen 2013). Reintegration should not only define as returning but also restoring the rights and creating sustainable livelihood.

As a continuation phase from deradicalization and disengagement process, reintegration expects to restore the former jihadist detainees fundamental human rights, provide alternative solutions instead of joining radical groups and continue the deradicalization program outside the jail. Therefore, BNPT (Badan Nasional Penganggulangan Terorisme) or The Indonesian National Counter-radicalism Agency starts to compose pre- and post-reintegration's plan in cooperation with local and national stakeholders especially Rehabilitation Center (Balai Pemasyarakatan or Bapas). The duties of Bapas are creating a social research to analyze the community readiness, providing counselling session during reintegration, and informing about government assistance nor deradicalization programs for former jihadist detainees. Ideally, on reintegration, the jihadist detainees's progress needs to be regularly monitored, especially in their employment, family and community condition. In order to securing income stability, the state should provide economic access to support the former jihadist detainees in a form of small medium enterprise funding, scholarship and personal skill (Mardlatillah and Hidayat 2019).

Jihadist detainees term refers to someone

who believes that she or he fight for Jihad (in Arabic, jihad means struggle) and as a translation of *mujahid* in Arabic (Sedgwick 2015). The meaning of jihad and jihadist become narrow as it used by several actors to conduct radical actions in the name of religion. They understand jihad as an effort to enforce Islamic values by using many strategies including through violence. Thus, some radical organizations and figures also use this term to propagate others for political interest, for example establishing Islamic state. In this paper, former jihadist detainees would refer to those who have been involved in radical actions such as terrorism based on jihad and sentenced for terror activities. Hence, the researcher divides the Solo jihadist detainees into three groups: those in prison, those who have been released and those who still want to perpetrate acts of violence. In this research, the author chose those who have been released to see their reintegration to the society.

By using qualitative method through in-depth interview, this paper presents stories of four former jihadist detainees in Solo region who could be the example of their struggles in reintegration process especially in social, economic, political and ideological objectives. The four former jihadist detainees would also frame the obstacles and opportunities that they have been encountered through their life experiences including their relations with state agencies and participation to a former jihadist organization. Furthermore, the interview also conducted with Rehabilitation center Klaten officer and Mr. Irwan from Sukoharjo Police department as the former jihadists' counselors. The additional sources gained from social media narration that was published by the former jihadis, including the Yayasan Gema Salam and Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN) YouTube channel. It focuses on a research question, how the reintegration process could support the struggle of former jihadist detainees

in Solo region to re-establish their new lives.

Reintegration for former jihadist detainees could be a tool to identify numerous problems and experiences in the post release phase. It could help to gain better understanding toward the problem arise to provide objectives for improving and developing further intervention (Weggemans and de Graaf 2017). The researchers argue that the former jihadists' strategies, movements, progress and achievements in Solo region are interesting to be researched because their stories would emphasize that reintegration is a holistic, gradual and intense process after the detain period. It needs more concern and cooperation among state, organizations, society and the former jihadist detainees personally. Reintegration process also determines the re-emergence of their radical thinking related to their return and recommitment to the groups. Furthermore, the meaning of reintegration for former jihadist detainees needs to be broaden into not only re-engage to the society but also contribute to the community development.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of reintegration should explain that reintegration as not only returning the former jihadist detainees to the host community, but also the basic human rights for former jihadist and their respective family (Ashour 2009; Horgan and Braddock 2011; Koehler 2018). Based on John Horgan study, reintegration process for former jihadist detainees is a prominent process that defines the encouragement of rejoining the group while the psychological and physical disengagement occurs as it mentioned on his works entitled *Deradicalization vs Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counter-radicalism Initiative in Need of Evaluation* (Horgan 2008). Mary Beth Altier, Emma Leonard Boyle, Neil

D. Shortland & John G. Horgan emphasized the influence reintegration from community side on their work titled "Why They Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-seven Autobiographical Accounts" that the impact of rejection and acceptance toward former jihadist detainees' reintegration could influence their next steps and become a prominent issue in the disengagement and deradicalization process (Altier et al. 2017). The disengagement, deradicalization and reintegration of former jihadist detainees is more dynamic process to conduct because it involves the push and pull factor during their shifting paradigm period.

Meanwhile, in the study on extremist reintegration paths conducted by Julie Chernov Hwang, Samsu Rizal Panggabean, and Ihsan Ali Fauzi in their writing titled "Why Terrorist Quit?" and "The Disengagement of Jihadist detainees in Poso Indonesia (Chernov-Hwang 2018; Hwang, Panggabean, and Fauzi 2013), they analyzed the variant reintegration processes of former extremists in Poso by using personal approach and elaborated on the difference between disengagement and deradicalization process similar to this research. Even though we uses their books as the primary literature, this research has distinguished social and cultural context that produces precise results. The communal conflict was motivating the Poso Jihadist detainees; meanwhile, Solo was never experiencing a similar conflict. The existence of religious movements and socio-political tendencies such as disappointment toward government influence the growth of religious radicalism and terrorism in Solo region. It makes the reintegration approach for Poso and Solo region are different.

The study of reintegration in Indonesia also an interesting topic to be studied. Some scholars have been researched about

the reintegration process of former radical extremist group, member and distinctly, former jihadist detainees. Saifudin Asrori wrote about the disengagement, deradicalization and reintegration of former jihadist detainees by selecting *Pesantren* Al-Islam which owned by the Bali Bomber's family, Chozin, and Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (YLP) which established by Ali Fauzi, the Bali bombing actor (Asrori 2019). On his writing, he explained how the presence of YLP and *Pesantren* could influence the disengagement of radical extremist members and force the deradicalization not only for the member but also family. He added that YLP also contributes toward the creation of project which involves the former jihadist detainees of non-violent extremist group to the terrorist prisoners' reintegration process. The writing persuades that the ex-terrorists in Lamongan has been succeed in the reintegration phase. While Asrori writing touches on the reintegration experience, Maliki described about the evaluation of social rehabilitation and reintegration of former jihadist detainees in Semarang. On his research, he stated that the social rehabilitation program inside the jail was ineffective because the radical networks still could be created, the insufficiency of prison's officer in religious knowledge and unclear program structure to prepare their releasement. In reintegration process, the rejection from society still remains which makes difficult to prepare appropriate environment for their reintegration (Maliki 2013).

This research will enrich and fulfil the gaps from previous research in disengagement and deradicalization, which could influence reintegration because all three concepts are intertwined. Meanwhile, most of the literature about the reintegration process of former jihadist detainees by using the personal perspective and various contexts, especially in Solo and Indonesia,

needs to be enhanced.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

One of the most influential literature in reintegration process titled "Towards A Theory of Ex-combatant Reintegration" written by Stina Torjesen (Torjesen 2013). She provided a basic conceptualization to analyze the reintegration of former combatant through three main areas; economy, social, and political. These three points were based on socio-economy-political approach and expected to give useful tools in reintegration assessment. Whilst, in the end of her writing, she stated that reintegration would remain emerging further methodological independence of the researcher to expand the concept broadly.

Based on economic, social and political field from The Theory of Reintegration by Stina Torjesen (Torjesen 2013), the researchers develops broader schemes in for former jihadist detainees and applies the theory to this writing. It expects to be a tool for analyzing the achievement of reintegration's dynamics and a linkage of different experiences and motivations to leave their previous life as a jihadi. The framework consists of an economic, social, political, and ideological scheme which also expects could be an evaluation and counter-challenge consideration not only for the former jihadist detainees but also the actor involves:

1. In the economic sphere, the former jihadist detainees could gain sustainable income through business or employment outside of the previous link/group and making regular reports after receiving financial aids.
2. The social sphere would emphasize the social circumstance and readiness of former jihadist detainees to return to society. In this phase, the most prominent issue is the condition of society started from the plan of

releasement until the reintegration. They have been disaffiliated with previous extremist groups, accepted by their surroundings, actively participate in community activities, and maintaining communication with state agencies. Thus, the other social activities could be joining organizations for former jihadist detainees and others similar which empower them economically and socially.

3. Because their involvement in jihad actions including terrorism is related to the government's hostile attitude; former jihadist detainees need to be re-engaged by the state in political activities. Their participation in political events would help them to restore their trust toward the government, including participating in the election, establishing good relations with government agencies, and participate in national ceremonies such as the Independence Day ceremony
4. The ideological sphere becomes the most challenging issue, not only in reintegration but also in the deradicalization process. The difference between political and ideological framework is politic refers to the former jihadist detainees' tangible attitude in responding the governmental issues including the relations with state agencies, participation in election and recognizing state policy. Meanwhile, ideological framework emphasizes to the thinking transformation and construction related to radicalism. The difficulty occurs because it is intangible and place as the core of radicalism. This ideological transformation is covering;

radical thinking transformation including the framing of 'enemy,' the meaning of *Jihad*, and violence, the changes toward religious understanding from exclusive to inclusive, especially in interpreting religious narratives, willingness to realize the previous actions while conducting the terror, a shifting perspective toward religious leaders and figure and re-engage and re-admit Pancasila as the fundamental basis of the state. Moreover, it also includes in personal scope that makes it uneasy about being intervened and measured. Thereupon it causes limited external influence from the state, non-state, and society.

RESEARCH METHOD

In this paper, the researcher used the qualitative method through in-depth interview with four former jihadist detainees in Solo region. Then, it was strengthened by secondary informants who have been involved in the reintegration process of the former jihadist detainees. Meanwhile, other supporting references come from several social media contents produced by the state agencies and the former jihadist detainees' organization that have been contributed toward the process.

The researcher came directly to the former jihadist detainees in Solo Region. Some of them agreed to be visited in their houses but some did not. The researcher chose four former jihadist detainees based on their availability and agreement to be interviewed because not all former jihadist detainees were allowing the researchers to have an interview. In addition, the four former jihadist detainees also have variety of backgrounds, cases and actions on their journey

of being a jihadist detainee such as bombing and poisoning plan. The four informants' age are between 35 to 50 years old. All of the informant identities and affiliations such as name and employment were using shadow names because of confidential issue. They would use Malik, Rahman, Mubarak and Yahya name as their pseudonym. It was slightly difficult to find the former jihadist detainees who are willing to be interviewed because most of them are ignore to be exposed as a former jihadist detainee. In some cases, the police officers helped in profiling and selecting the informants since some of the former jihadist detainees are still under monitoring of BNPT and consider as person with high radical level. Additional information that is useful for validating their information gained from Bapas Klaten and Sukoharjo's Police officers namely Mr. Irwan who are working on the reintegration process of former jihadist detainees in Solo region. The other supporting references came from social media narration that was published by the former jihadist detainees, including the Yayasan Gema Salam and Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN) YouTube channel, which contains the personal journey of former jihadist detainees in Solo's transformation.

The Profile of Figures

In this research, there are four former jihadist detainees in Solo region who were willing to explain their stories briefly in the nuance of their social, political, economic and ideological aspects.

The first former jihadi is Malik. Malik was involved in what he called as jihad through conducting a poisoning plan at Polda Metro Jaya in 2011. During his job in Jakarta, he met several people in Abubakar Baasyir's public recitation at the mosque near his boarding house. In the public

recitation, he has an encounter with several people with the same understanding and drive to learn Islamic teachings. They communicated intensively eventually creating *pengajian tertutup* (exclusive recitation) with seven members including him. With these six other people, his radical thinking started to grow. It was strengthened by 2010 when he visited *Ustadz* Fajar Taslim and Abu Husna, in the jail. Fajar Taslim is the main actor behind the Palembang terror actions in 2007 and Abu Husna is a terrorist prisoner who convicted for hiding Abu Dujana, the suspect of Poso attack in 2007. During his visit, he received *tausyiah* (a short Islamic preaching from religious figure which contains messages in terms of truth and religious value) from Fajar Taslim and Abu Husna. Not only receiving *tausyiah*, he was also experiencing discrimination from the police officers. Malik was not allowed to bring food to Fajar Taslim but after he left, only half of the food remained. Another occurrence which shaped his actions came after he visited *Ustadz* Abu Husna, where he was locked in the cell by the prison officer. After these discriminations and learning process of Jihad with the group, his willingness to take the revenge arise. Then, with other fellows, he created a plan to poisoning people who attend Independence Day ceremony in Polda Metro Jaya as an effort for jihad and defending Muslim from discrimination. But before he commenced the action, he was arrested by Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88). After he was caught, Malik was trialed for six years imprisonment, but in the final trial was finally sentenced to four years. Granted parole, he only spent three years and three months total time in prison. Then, Malik was released and reintegrated in 2014.

The second jihadi is Rahman who was convicted for gun smuggling and attack plan to police office. Rahman was a middle-aged man who work works as a company officer in Jakarta until he met some people from a public recitation

in a mosque near his house. Along with them, he joined with a Muslim solidarity group, which responding the Poso and Ambon conflicts as a part of concern toward Muslim condition in the conflict field. He and his friends were going to Poso to fight as a jihadist while the rest collected money in Jakarta through charity boxes. After all of the former fighters returned, their feelings and memories about the war stayed remaining. Because they have witnessed violence toward Muslim, they committed to defend Islam by conducting military training based on Al-Qur'an Al-Anfal verse 60 (*prepare against them what force you can and horses tethered (fed for war). Thereby you may dismay the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others besides them who are unknown to you but known to Allah. Whatever you spend in the Way of Allah, it will be paid back to you thoroughly, and you shall not be wronged*) and the team sprang to several Jakarta regions. Rahman became the leader of West Jakarta team. Therefore, they collected the money and bought the gun from Philippines privately. The gun couriers transferred the gun from the Philippines to Kalimantan via ferry, then continued to couriers in Makassar and ended in Tanjung Perak, Surabaya. When they arrived in Tanjung Perak, they were arrested. After that interception, the government started the further operation to find the gun smuggler's network until finally found Rahman's involvement. He stated that mapping activities that they have done existed, but it was not proposed to conduct a terror. It was aimed for preparation for preventing same conflicts as Ambon and Poso and as a jihadist, he tried to implement Al-Anfal verse 60. Rahman was arrested in 2011 and sued for eight years in prison. Then, he received parole in the middle of his prison term and reintegrated in 2015.

The next former Jihadi namely Mubarak began his journey as a jihadist from his curiosity to learn Islam. Mubarak was a success businessman

in Klaten until he went for Hajj and realized that he has a lack of religious knowledge. Then, he learned about Islamic teaching from ustad (Syeikh) in a mosque near his house. Time by time, he realized that in his surrounding, people divided based on two biggest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Mubarak's eagerness to find the reason and 'truth' led him to join both organizations. But he could not find the 'truth'. When his curiosity was getting bigger, Mubarak continues his spiritual journey to Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS (Islam-based party in Indonesian parliamentary). When he joined PKS, he usually received leaflets containing narration about condemnation toward democracy, such as "democracy is heretical" and "democracy is *haram*." Mubarak was questioning and investigating it until he found that it was from Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or HTI, a radical Islamist group in Indonesia. Then, he moved to HTI and acknowledged that the leaflet's contents are justified by religious narrations. In HTI, Mubarak could meet and interact with many Islam activists, including those who come from MMI or Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahideen Council). In MMI, Mubarak could have a direct encounter with Abubakar Baasyir and became his fans. The time when Abubakar Baasyir was supporting ISIS and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), a terrorist organization which affiliates with ISIS, Mubarak followed Baasyir's decision. Mubarak joined Azzam Dakwah Center (ADC), a camouflage organization of ISIS supporters which works for *dakwah* and social projects. ADC had a building in Solo city as a typical non-profit organization, but it aimed to drive the establishment of the Islamic state. After receiving command from ISIS, Mubarak willingness to be a Jihadist was growing stronger. He and other eight comrades committed bombing attack in one of Solo's restaurant owns by a Chinese who was reported as blasphemmer because of ripping

Al-Qur'an. In his prison term, he informed by the Police that it was wrong information. Mubarak was arrested in 2016 and sentenced to 3,5 years of punishment, but he received parole and national leave (*cuti bersama nasional*). Therefore, he only needed to spend two years and seven months and released in 2019.

The last jihadi is Yahya. Yahya spent most of his education time in public school and continued to an Islamic school in Solo, the Al-Mukmin Ngruki Foundation, owned by Abu Bakar Baasyir. He learned about Islamic teachings in that school, attended Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Manaf recitations, and visited many other Islamic recitations. There, he met several Islamic religious teachers and learned from them. When the conflict in Ambon occurred in 1999, his understanding of *Jihad fissabilillah* (fight in the name of God) started to rise and he motivated to be a jihadist. Yahya also joined Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) but after several involvements, he quieted because of its high radical doctrines. Then, because Yahya's hobby is reading, he read many *Laskar Jihad* (*Jihad Army*) magazines and a book titled *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah*. *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* is a book that contains a compilation of Abdullah Azam preaching for *Mujahidin* (Islamic fighter) in Afghanistan which also contributes to the emergence of *Jihad* Afghanistan or now well-known as Al-Qaeda and his motivations to fight for religion. After Yahya graduated from Senior High School, he numerous sweeping activities based on the Islamic teaching called *Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (fighting against badness and enforcing goodness) emerged in Solo Region. A group, namely *Hisbah* Team or Tim *Hisbah* (*Hisbah* means justice), led by Sigit Qordhowi, a terrorist shot dead by Special Detachment 88 in 2011, started the movement. Yahya joined with the organization because he felt that his involvement could strengthen his motivation to be a jihadist. In the meantime, Tim

Hisbah believed that the government has failed in solving many social problems in Solo, such as prostitution, gambling, and alcohol selling. At the first time, the primary mission of the Tim *Hisbah* was fighting against mischief, but it changed when Sigit Qordhowi re-arranged the tasks into more radical in practice. Around 2010, Tim *Hisbah* members were gathered and pledged for a death vow (*bai'at mati*), which means they should be loyal to Sigit Qordhowi and have been commanded to learn about assembling a bomb, creating detonator, exploding the bomb, and using guns for *Jihad*. Sigit Qordhowi's comrades committed several minor bombing incidents without any coordination and put the group in chaos. The police started a special investigation until some of them have arrested. Regarding the chaotic situation, Sigit Qordhowi commanded Yahya and his friend to escape to Cirebon. In Cirebon, they met a group organized by Musolah and friends. Musolah group is a terrorist group behind the Cirebon Police Office, which was causing 25 people injured, and planned to merge his group with Yahya's. But after the Cirebon bombing occurred, Yahya considered as involve in the accident and was arrested in 2011. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment but only served for about six years because of the parole.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Reintegration Process of Former Jihadist Detainees in Solo Region: Challenges and Opportunities

The reintegration process among former jihadist detainees in Solo region would show how the external and internal factors could influence their transformation. By focusing on the four objectives of reintegration; social, political, economic, and ideological, personal and other actors' contribution toward their changes will discover. It will also answer the dilemma on the needs of implementing reintegration in practice.

Social Reintegration

The Malik and Yahya reintegration were gaining acceptance from the host community. Malik's neighbors helped him to build a house and allowed him to work. He and his family developed good relations with society and actively participate in public events such as community gatherings, *kerja bakti*, and assisting neighbors if they face administrative problems with the police department using his close connection with state agencies. Malik also contributes toward his community development by establishing a fish farming for empowering youth around him. After receiving funding and training from Diponegoro University, he started the fish farming with the youth. Malik could distribute his fish to several distributor in Central Java, improve the economy for his family and surrounding and strengthening his relationship with society. Meanwhile, Yahya was able to maintain his relationship with the community because he had been well-known as a knowledgeable person prior to his arrest. In fact, he had been appointed as a religious preacher in his district, a position he continues to hold¹. According to Malik's neighbor, his kind and helpful behavior toward surrounding, both before and after being a detainee, helped him to regain the trust from society. Meanwhile, Balai Pemasarakatan or Bapas (Rehabilitation Center) Klaten officer as one of Yahya's counsellors stated that Yahya's intelligent and charismatic figure play a key role in society acceptance.

Unlike Malik and Yahya, both Mubarak and Rahman experienced social stigmatization and could not escape the label of "terrorist." Mubarak was shunned by his neighbor, which affected his business, and rejection from his son-in-law's family. He spent three months trying to approach them and to adjust to their reactions. Also, he

tried to explain the problem of his involvement in a radical group to his family. All of his efforts aimed to restore people's trust towards him so he could continue his new life. Not only from society, but his son also put distrust on him by asking to move from Islamic boarding school in Ngruki to public school in Klaten because he afraid of being jihadist detainee like his father in the future. Finally, he fulfilled the permission. Now, Mubarak success in regaining the public and family trust.

Like Mubarak, after Rahman returned to his hometown of Karanganyar, he suffered from stigmatization. This affected not only him, individually, but also his family. Rahman's children and wife have struggled to socialize with those in their community because most people in his village kept their distance from them. The worst social problem they faced was the rapid spread of information about Rahman's actions as a former jihadist. It made all of the people in his sub-district aware of him and his family. The family spent three years from 2015 to 2018 striving to gain public trust. Even though he has welcomed by society, the terrorist label was attached to him. During our interview sessions, this researcher met some people and mentioned Rahman's name, but they were confused. When the researcher explained about Rahman and his employment, people claimed not to be aware of this. After the researcher confirmed the issue to Rahman, he said that there were two reasons for peoples' confusion. First, there are three individuals named Rahman in the district. Second, the villagers would not recognize his name if a visitor only mentioned Rahmans' name and employment, because he is commonly recognized as 'Rahman the terrorist' rather than 'Rahman the village businessman' or 'Rahman *jamu*'. People tend to call him by the name "Rahman the terrorist," although this clearly makes him uncomfortable. In the end, however, he can do

¹ This stories according to Bapas Klaten officers and Malik's wife

nothing about this and accepts it for what it is. Therefore, in an effort to erase the label, he engages with the local society by empowering youth in fish farming, involving himself in *jamu* making, and working in village businesses. He wants to be known as a Rahman *jamu* or 'Rahman village business' rather than as 'Rahman the terrorist.' Rahman believes that the labelling issue is the state agency's responsibility because everyone in his village knew his case based on publications.

Luckily, Mubarak, Malik, Yahya and Rahman family members. According to Malik's wife and Bapas Klaten officers's statements, the family and relatives have accepted the four former jihadist detainee's return, because even during the time in which they were involved in terror actions, they still fulfilled their role as a father and husband as usual and maintain a good relationship with their families. It was partly because of this that their wives and children were not aware of their commitment to conducting the terror. But in some stories, there are indications that family support could potentially contribute to the disengagement process (Harris-Hogan 2014).

Malik, Yahya, Rahman, and Mubarak have all been disaffiliated from the radical groups to which they once belonged. They said that most of their fellow group members have arrested and the groups demolished. They have no connections with their comrades as a group, but Yahya and Mubarak sometimes have virtual communication with their friends as individuals. Mubarak said that some of his fellows might feel uncomfortable about this because, as they know, after his reintegration, Mubarak worked with military agencies, especially Densus 88. Because of these circumstances, several people in his previous network (ISIS and JAD) called him *murtad* (apostate) and *kafir* (infidel)

Economic Reintegration

Economically, most of the former jihadist detainees were experiencing difficulties right after their reintegration. Malik worked as a laborer while Mubarak was a temporary worker in several places until he received financial assistance. Furthermore, Mubarak was involved with debts for maintaining his family's economy. The same condition also occurs in Rahman and Yahya's life. They could establish the business after receiving aids from some government institutions such as the Ministry of Social Affairs (Kementerian Sosial) and BNPT. The assistance helps them start the small business and restoring the family's economic condition. They considered that prioritizing economic issues gives them an alternative way to disengage from their radical group, especially for Mubarak. Mubarak's contemplation of his previous actions also brings him into an economic acknowledgment that by joining radical groups, he overrides family matters and only focuses on *Jihad*. Moreover, he also mentioned that most of his friends who are still involved in several radical groups had faced economic problems.

Although it has been mentioned in an article of Convey Indonesia, a project between UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and UNDP (United Nations Development Program), that "*Economic instability, poverty, and unemployment acknowledged to be the driven factor of a person to get involved in terrorism, radicalism, and violent extremism*"(2019) but the economic issue on reintegration suggests the opposite. The story of Malik, Rahman, Yahya and Mubarak's participation in radical actions shows that there is no significant connection between one's economic condition and their motivation for becoming involved in jihad. Therefore, economic plans should not be the only prominent mechanism for detaching former jihadist detainees from

their religious radical group nor jihad activities. Mubarak explained about financial difficulties among his jihad fellows. He said that most of the former terrorist prisoners joined extremist groups in the name of jihad because of political and ideological problems. Then, they disengaged from their groups because of family concerns. In the meantime, some people who called themselves as a jihadist had come to believe that they were not the only ones who faced economic problems, but that other people in society also struggled with these because of social discrimination and inequality. It motivated them to express their spirit to enforce justice through jihad actions.

Political Reintegration

The personal experiences related to discrimination, knowledge that gained through public recitation or literature, involvement in religious radical and extremism group which propagating the government let them to commit radical nor violence actions which they considered *Jihad* to achieve the changes they desired. Therefore, the most tangible way to examine their political reintegration is to consider their attitudes toward political activities.

While the former jihadist detainees were being more radical and sought to enforce what they regarded as Islamic values rather than accepting the state constitution, that is a manifestation of understanding about jihad. The rise of social problems has frequently triggered radical extremist people to tackle the issue by starting anti-government movements, which sometimes include the use of violence. Such extremists use religious doctrine as their fundamental logic and as a weapon, for example conducting massive raids into known sites of prostitution and gambling in the name of enforcing Islamic values. As Yahya said, society accepts the raids and takes advantages from the activities in their daily lives

such as the decrease number of criminal cases. Such circumstances that create by the Islamic group's raid have also contributed to the rapid growth of Islamic movement in the Solo Region. Recently, after Yahya reintegrated, he noticed that the Solo region government had started to solve various social problems, which resulted in his growing trust of the government. Furthermore, Mubarak's intense collaboration with Detasemen 88 or Densus 88 (Special Detachment 88) in *The Wedangan*, a restaurant that established by Densus 88 for empowering former jihadist detainees in Solo, the relationship between Malik and Sragen's military agency are further evidence of a trust rebuilding between the government and former jihadist detainee.

Ideological Reintegration

The former jihadist detainees ideological thinking could not be separated from political transformation. Here the presence of ideological transformation places as the core changes of radicalism and could be detected from their framing of an enemy, the meaning of *Jihad*, and violence, the changes toward religious understanding from exclusive to inclusive, especially in interpreting religious narratives, willingness to realize the previous actions while conducting the terror, a shifting perspective toward religious leaders, and re-engage and re-admit Pancasila as the fundamental basis of the state constitution. Direct encounter with 'enemy', literatures, government attitude's change and religious leaders influence play the major role in the ideological transformation among four former jihadist detainees in Solo. The changes occur started from their imprisonment phase until reintegration.

One of the strategies to identify the religious radical thinking shift among former jihadist detainees in the Solo Region is examining their

construction toward enemy and *Jihad*. The two issues prominently influence their motivations and actual conditions during the reintegration. All four informants show different ideological transformations which have manifested in their perspectives, narratives, and attitudes. Previously, Malik, Rahman, Mubarak, and Yahya were framing that enemy is government, people from another religion nor Muslim which considers as do not belong to their group. They also believed that strategy to commit Jihad is through violence. But, after they received a conviction, surpassing personal journey, and deradicalization program during imprisonment, it changes. Malik, who has been preparing poison for police officers in Polda Metro Jaya, is currently becoming a police and military partner through his personal relations with them such as intense communication via social media and regular visitation. His direct encounter with a police officer who helped him to smuggle some books in prison, military agencies worked in building Malik's house along with society, and a 'brotherhood relationship' with army officers during his reintegration phase have erased the bad image of them. Almost similar to Malik, Mubarak also experienced receiving assistance from government and military agencies who previously believed as an incapable institution. After he returns, he has been supported by Densus 88 in obtaining a job and capital for establishing a food stall. Both of them have been re-establish their conceptualization toward the enemy and break radical ideology. Meanwhile, the unique circumstance occurs on Yahya and Rahman.

Yahya's radical ideology grew because of some kinds of literature, the religious leaders' influence, and the government's response in solving the social problems. His affiliation with the group was because he received indoctrination and willingness to make a change in society in the name of jihad. Additionally, the main enemy in

Yahya's view were the gamblers, prostitutes, and troublemakers until it shifted into police officers and government who have been suppressed his team during sweeping which he considered as the obstacle for jihad. His eagerness to detach the radical thinking is because of the counter narrations that he received from books in the jail's library, new religious teachers whom he met in prison, and counseling session from BNPT. Another prominent issue in the Yahya case is the constructive thinking that the main enemy is the social problem, not the government. Therefore, supported by the improvement of the state's action to overcome those issues effectively, his radical idea collapses steadily. It means that both Yahya and government are in the same boat. Concurrently, Rahman insists that the reason behind his affiliation with the military training and gun smuggling is a religious command called *Ihdad* (preparation) to prevent the repeated conflict alike in Poso. On one side, it was causing a blurry on his enemy framing because he never mentioned specific identifications whom he opposes. But on the other side, he reflects a displeasure toward the government related to family matters, for example, when he talked about responsibility to restore his reputation and aim to defend Muslim that committed for jihad but being labelled as an extremist or radical by the state.

Before gaining understanding about the former jihadist detainees dramatic transformation of radical ideology from offensive and defensive to exclusively defensive (Chernov-Hwang 2018), the main problem is their framing of enemy. The jihadist detainees indicate themselves as a victim not an attacker, the one who called as 'innocent' has collective responsible, and their actions is a way to express the revolution willingness such as toward government legitimacy issues (Cohan 2006; Held 2004). In the case of former jihadist detainees in Solo region, the time when they obtain

personal experiences that change their thinking (usually during disengagement), they possibly deconstruct their previous ideologies (Bjergo and Horgan 2009). Amongst Malik, Mubarak, Rahman, and Yahya, the representation of the enemy has changed and influenced their social, political, and economic relations during their reintegration. Although Rahman's point of view toward the reason behind his previous operation considers as faint to be detected as radicalism residue, his less violent behavior could be seen as a positive ideological transformation. Interestingly, all of their understandings toward *Jihad* also shifted. *Jihad* that defined as a strive in the name of God against *kafir* (infidel) by justifying violent actions, transformed into a more inclusive meaning. Rather than war, their religious interpretations toward the word '*Jihad*' expand to struggle in achieving goals by any means, including wealth, spirit, and knowledge based on the religious values and prophet Muhammad's attitude (Irawan 2014).

Religious value believes in containing compassion, peace, and humanity that need to be practiced in families, society, and the country. For Malik, Rahman, and Mubarak, manifesting Islamic values by using arms considered improper according to the current condition of Indonesia. Meanwhile, Yahya determines that coercion in the name of Islam would only emerge Islamophobia and give disadvantageous toward Muslim. Furthermore, Yahya, Malik, Rahman, and Mubarak have started to collaborate with the government in making some small enterprises involved in social activities, for example, when Rahman empowers society in *Jamu* making or Yahya's work in religious preaching, and joining deradicalization program with BNPT. Also, they have decided to re-accept Pancasila as the state's fundamental basis after previously demanded to establish an Islamic state and do not easily label others as *kafir* (infidel).

The Role of State and Non-state Agencies during Reintegration

Analyzing the journey of four former jihadist detainees in Solo region during their social, economic, political and ideological reintegration raises the notion on how the state and non-state stakeholders contribute to the process. It also determines the accomplishment of reintegration to prevent the emergence of recidivist.

In this section, the author would explain the role of state and non-state actors' involvement on the preparation, progress and achievements of reintegration in Solo Region. It also adds the obstacles and the needs of improvement toward the process.

Before the former jihadist detainees reintegrated, state institutions through Bapas, the prison (Lembaga Pemasyarakatan), Police, and the military agency would conduct Litmas or Penelitian Pemasyarakatan (Social Research) related to evaluating the readiness of society for their return. There are two Bapas who involved in the reintegration process of former jihadist detainees in Solo region. First Bapas Solo which covers Solo city, Boyolali, Karanganyar and Sragen. Second, Bapas Klaten for Klaten, Sukoharjo and Wonogiri. Both Bapas work in integration and cooperation in related field. The preparation for the former jihadist detainees' parole and reintegration requires a signature from the heads of their village and district as representatives of society. It also requires agreements from their family and neighbors. After the bureaucratic process related to the district, family and neighborhood was accomplished, the Social Counselor (Pembimbing Kemasyarakatan) of Bapas Solo and/or Klaten would send the result to the prison where it would be examined before the letter was issued. After the jihadist detainees are released, the Bapas's concern toward their reintegration process would focus

on the former terrorist in particular, largely restricted to aftercare related to their social condition. Sometimes the Social Counselor, Police, and military agencies would visit them to monitor their activities, but there was no routine social monitoring. Take the case of Rahman as an example of how society could influence the reintegration process. In the beginning of social research, the host community agreed to accept him and his family. They also signed the letter of acceptance and provide equal treatment for Rahman and his family. But in fact, some people still labelling Rahman as a former jihadist detainee or further, terrorist. The social dynamic that occurs in society including the behavioral changes among society need to be concerned by the respective institution. It raises a question on how the continuous monitoring should be created in reintegration (Weggemans and de Graaf 2017).

After the former jihadist detainees reintegrated to the host community, economic sustainability becomes one of the most challenging issues to overcome. In the counter-radicalism agenda, the Indonesian government focuses on disengagement rather than deradicalization because disengagement shows tangible transformations based on former terrorist jihadists' behavioral changes (Asrori 2019). These changes come from the alternatives that they receive after they disengage from radical groups. One of the choices is restoring their economic circumstances after their release.

Even though the economic approach is necessary for breaking the cycle of radicalism, it needs further monitoring and evaluation in terms of how financial assistance is distributed. According to Mr. Irwan, the head of police intelligent department and counsellor of former jihadist detainee in the Solo region, the Bapas Solo and Klaten and Solo military agencies assist in aid distribution

to purchase the equipment, and build a small enterprise. BNPT also provides Pop Warung program, a small store which sells daily needs for the former jihadist detainees in several region. For Solo region, there are six former jihadist detainees who received the assistance including Rahman and Malik. Meanwhile, Mubarak received funding from BNPT which amount 10 million to establish the soto stall and Yahya received 15 million from Ministry of social affairs to build his food stalls. Moreover, Yahya received goats from Klaten and Surakarta's police agencies and Malik received goat from the Ministry of social affairs that he developed to be a farm along with cow and duck. The process of economic assimilation is regarded as important to escalating the religious radical thinking transformation and providing the alternative for their future (Nillson, Sweden, and Styrelsen för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete 2005).

Instead of the deradicalizing issue, evaluation of economic assistance is also related to the independence of former jihadist detainees. The former jihadist detainee receive 'extraordinary attention' from the government, which includes intense training from BNPT and numerous sources of financial aid from the Ministry of Social Affairs or other institutions. These circumstances potentially influence the former jihadist detainees' economic independence, such as establishing an enterprise if they only receive capital from the government. By being subject to regular monitoring and evaluation, they would feel responsibilities toward their belongings and work on it seriously. Furthermore, it also could prevent the problem of capital being misused, such as to support or establish new terrorist networks (Bambang Sugeng Rukmono 2020). In addition, extra concern for former jihadist detainees's economy might cause resentment among other jihadist detainees.

Until 2021, about 160 former terrorist prisoners, also jihadist detainees, had been released in the Solo region but there was only a single coordinator from BNPT for the Central Java region². This causes lack of comprehensive monitoring the former jihadist detainees's progress after receiving the aids such as gradual report and visitation to each former jihadist detainees businesses. One of the strategies to overcome this problem is the centralization of the distribution, monitoring, and data collection relating to local former terrorist prisoner's organizations. For the Solo Region, the government collaborates with Yayasan Gema Salam. After jihadist detainees are released from prison, BNPT allows them to join the former terrorist prisoners' organization to gain information about regular national deradicalization programs, financial assistance, and other activities. The distribution scheme is based on organizational data including name, affiliation, address, etc. After that, Gema Salam would inform their members and invite them to join the assistance meetings with the government. Here, it plays a key role in bridging the government and former jihadist detainee' communication. If a former jihadist detainees rejects the offer to join with Gema Salam, he would not be eligible to obtain aid. Their involvement in the organization could also be used to determine the status of former jihadist detainee. It is worth noting, that former jihadist detainees who reject assistance from the Indonesian government are potentially still attached to their earlier radical leanings. The complicated situation regarding their choices makes government institutions and many other actors including NGOs attempt to approach them personally, while at the same time, the National Intelligence agency monitors

them strictly.

One path that possibly implements to maintain and restore the ideological and political transformation of former jihadist detainees is involving them directly in the national deradicalization program collaborates with the government institution. Both of them need a space and interdependency relationship. The Indonesian government could collaborate with former jihadist detainees in Solo Region to map, monitor the existing radicalism movements nor actors around Solo. Also, they could support the effort to maintain a humanistic approach toward other reintegrated ex-jihadist detainees who are considered by Densus 88 and BNPT as highly radicals. Then, the former terrorist prisoners could obtain assistance and protection from government agencies, as experienced by Ali Imron, one of Bali bombing actor who is working for helping government in counterterrorism agenda. Recently, every year they are invited to attend the deradicalization program by BNPT as participants. Also, their participation in the election or attendance in the Independence Day ceremony could not be the only benchmark to measure their hatred evolvement to the nation. They are supposed to be more active in working with state agencies on counter radicalism programs practically. This plan figures to be a strategy to restore the former jihadist detainees trust and retaining the deradicalization process throughout reintegration.

One strategy that has been accomplished by both government and former jihadist detainees is the creation of media narration in counter-radicalism issues in the online platform. Yayasan Gema Salam's videos about the visitation from BNPT and local governments to their organizations nor small enterprises,

2 This statement is based on an interview session with Mr. Irwan as the Head of the Intelligent department at Sukoharjo Police Office. He is also working as the counselor for former terrorist prisoners in Solo Region

the development of former terrorist prisoner's business, and social activities in communities could be a tool to show their transformations and contributions for public goods. Concurrently, Badan Intelijen Negara or BIN (Indonesian Intelligent Agency) Republic Indonesia also creates YouTube content about the profile of some jihadist detainees in Solo as a campaign and public education in counter-radicalism programs. The creation of alternative narratives in media potentially emerge the public awareness toward the issues, directly involving the former jihadist detainees in the deradicalization process and countering propaganda distribution in media (Glazzard 2017; Reed, Haroro J Ingram, and Whittaker 2017). The case of Yahya shows how the counter-narratives played a prominent role in changing his mindset. In this rapid technological development, social media platforms usages as a counter-narrative communication utterly important to pursue.

CONCLUSION

From this research, the researcher concludes several issues related to the study of reintegration for former jihadist detainees. In a discussion about jihadist detainees, the understanding toward the term should be divided to three categories: those in prison, those who have been released and those who still want to perpetrate acts of violence. In this research, the author chose those who have been released to see their reintegration to the society. It would help to prevent the overlapping of analysis.

The transformation of thinking and perspective toward jihad has occurred among the four former jihadist in Solo region. Their jihad as radical group's member has ended but jihad as a Muslim keep remains in a new life. Even though they might face exclusion or stigmatization from

their previous group for example being called as apostate and infidel. The understanding captured from their decision to disaffiliate from their network and thinking shift toward Jihad. Rather than return to previous group, they join to the former jihadist detainees' organization namely Yayasan Gema Salam.

Deeper transformation could be analysed from their political, economic, social and ideological aspects. Yahya efforts to establish his own food stalls by using the assistances from government institution, Malik and Rahman's contribution toward community development through fish farming and Jamu making, and Mubarak cooperation with Densus 88 in The Wedangan reflects the accomplishment of reintegration broadly. Their previous narrow conception of jihad refers to the usage of violence in the name of religion but it expands into an effort which reflects the compassion of religion such as earn a living for family and empowering the surrounding.

Looking at the result of reintegration process, government from local to national need to create gradual and more comprehensive reintegration scheme started from the preparation to aftercare. The problem of human resources for monitoring the former jihadist detainees in Central Java, for example, shows the demand of improvement. Yet, the Bapas research, counselling session, psychological support, financial distribution and government strategy for involving the former jihadist detainees in counter radicalism program considered as achievements.

Lastly, the relationship between religion radicalism, extremism terrorism cannot be prevented. While religion is not the leading cause of terrorism, radicalism, and extremism, many violent actions have a religious dimension. The jihadist detainees, both as a person or organization, is often citing the

holy book verses, misinterpreting the content, and mobilizing others to follow their views. The religious interpretation would root in their mind and manifest in their attitude even though after they were imprisoned for several years, joined deradicalization programs, changed their behavior, signed an agreement letter of loyalty to the state, and reintegrate into society. Ideology will always becomes the most intangible subject to be detected and measured. Therefore, gradual reintegration and deradicalization necessarily to conduct to maintain the former jihadist detainees' behavior.

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